The current financial problems of some Euro-area Member States have been tackled by ad hoc financial institutions, formed outside of the EU as international institutions and aimed at granting financial assistance on the basis of strict conditionality measures, which seriously affect human rights (particularly social and economic rights).
Introduction
In recent times, the Eurozone Member States (MS) have devised complex international financial mechanisms, tightly linked to themselves and European Union (EU) institutions but formally set outside the EU. These mechanisms were necessary because of the EU's perceived inability to help MS, and the Eurozone MS in particular, to get out of the crisis. After briefly analyzing how the financial crisis has been managed, this article will focus on human rights concerns that stem from these strict conditionality measures, and on the responsibility for possible human rights violations, with particular regard to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) framework.
Managing the crisis

Financial devices: the EFSM, the EFSF, the ESM
In order to address the crisis of sovereign debt, three financial stability mechanisms 
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The EFSM was established by EU Regulation No. 407/2010, III on the basis of Article 122(2) TFEU, to grant Union financial assistance to a MS affected by or seriously threatened with a severe economic or financial disturbance caused by exceptional occurrences beyond its control. According to Article 3(2) of this Regulation, such assistance is granted via a decision adopted by the European Council, which essentially dictates the payment methods and the economic conditions attached to the Union's financial assistance. The EFSM, however, could only provide financial assistance of up to €60 billion, through a joint process between the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF); IV and the total amount provided for the EFSM was, therefore, quite low in the context of the ongoing economic crisis.
Thus, in order to increase the amount of financial assistance available, new steps were necessary; for this reason the Euro-area MS signed an agreement to establish the EFSF, a public limited liability company (société anonyme) incorporated in and governed by the laws of Luxembourg, with its registered office in Luxembourg-City. V The EFSF was funded by the Euro-area MS as shareholders, while its decisions were made by the EFSF's governing bodies. This early mechanism granted financial assistance to Ireland, Portugal and Greece but was just a temporary measure. VI This temporary aspect notwithstanding its significant financial capacity (€440 billion), VII led the Euro-area MS to adopt the ESM as a replacement for the EFSF, and to assume the tasks fulfilled by it.
VIII
The ESM is, in contrast, a permanent financial mechanism with a lending capacity of up to €500 billion ("including the outstanding EFSF stability support"), IX 
Strict conditionality and responsibility
The legal nature of the ESM and its (lack of) responsibility for human rights violations
In order to address the ESM's potential responsibility and the possibility of filing suits against it before an international court, it is necessary to understand the legal nature of the ESM and whether it is bound by human rights law.
The first question, namely that of the ESM's legal nature, is not clearly answered by the wording of the ESM Treaty. Indeed, while Article 1 of the Treaty defines the ESM as an "international financial institution", this is an expression notable for its ambiguities, as pointed out by Napolitano, who has highlighted that, although created by an international agreement, the ESM has a European dimension, which makes it quite close to a European agency (Napolitano 2012). According to Napolitano, this dimension is seen in several of its Thus, it is difficult to identify the ESM's direct responsibility for violations of human rights caused by conditionality measures; one may wonder, however, whether it is possible that the EU institutions and the ESM's MS could be responsible for ESM actions that violate these rights.
The ESM's measures and the potential responsibility of EU institutions
The issue of the responsibility of EU institutions involved in the ESM for acts adopted by the latter that affect human rights arises for two reasons: first, because of the EU institutions' relevant role in granting financial assistance within the framework of the ESM, and second, because even in that framework such institutions should respect EU law in general, and human rights in particular. The Advocate General Kokott had clearly The GC, however, pointed out that the MoU was in fact adopted by the ESM, not by the EU institutions, and the MoU merely approved the measures already adopted by the Republic of Cyprus. Therefore, the GC dismissed the actions as inadmissible in part and in part manifestly lacking any foundation in law.
The GC thus denied that there was any worth in the behavior of EU institutions involved in the MoU negotiations or in the approval of conditionality rules adopted by the Republic of Cyprus, even after the lengthy negotiations at the EU level that were guided by a process that involved EU institutions and the Eurogroup. Moreover, the GC affirmed the non-applicability of the CFREU because the ESM is set outside the EU. However, pursuant 
The ESM's measures and the potential responsibility of Member States
In addition to EU institutions, the question arises as to whether the ESM's shareholders -namely the Euro-area MS -could be responsible for acts that the ESM adopted.
In this perspective, the responsibility of Euro-area MS could be derived from the ICESCR (to which all the ESM's MS are parties).
Specifically, this possibility could be derived following, mutatis mutandi, the reasoning of 
Final remarks
This analysis has shown that the tools established to tackle Euro-area MS' difficulties in fact give rise to human rights concerns because of the conditionality measures attached to economic adjustment programs.
Furthermore, this analysis has illustrated the difficulty in invoking any responsibility for possible infringements of human rights provisions.
Primarily, the ESM itself is not bound by human rights treaties, and the possibility to recall jus cogens seems not to be a viable option.
Secondly, the ECJ has also denied any possible responsibility of EU institutions involved in such a financial mechanism because the ESM is set outside EU law. This is true of course. But, while EU institutions might be acting within the confines of the ESM, they should respect EU law, including the CFREU. Such a circumstance could be inferred by Article 13 TEU, and moreover has been highlighted by the Advocate General Kokott in her opinion regarding the Pringle case. The latter's suggestion, expressed with regard to the Pringle case was, however, not even considered by the ECJ in the set of rulings regarding Cyprus, where the Court was expressly required to consider the possible responsibility of the ECB and the EC in light of potential fundamental rights breaches.
Lastly, the responsibility of Eurozone Member States, which are parties to the ESM, although theoretically possible, is de facto unrealistic.
Thus, in this realm, possible violations of human rights depending on conditionality measures are not likely to be remedied through the traditional legal channels.
This scenario would probably change if the ESM was to be set within the EU legal system. Indeed, as it would then be a body of the EU, it would certainly have to act in cohesion with the full extent of EU Law, and thus with the CFREU.
The possibility of linking the mechanisms to manage crisis situations (such as the ESM)
to the EU system has been already considered by legal scholars (Schwarz 2014 ; see also Gallo 2015: 31); such a possibility, however, inevitably implies a new political will to reform the current legal framework governing financial aid within the Eurozone. XI According to the procedure established by Art. 48 TFEU, the Decision 2011/199 added a third paragraph to Art. 136 TFEU: "The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality". XII TSCG, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/workarea/downloadAsset.aspx?id=27066 (last visited 15 Dec. 2015 XXI The Decision No. 2011/199 was adopted on the basis of Art. 48 TFEU, which concerns the simplified revision process. However, since this process can be used only with regard to Part Three of the TFEU and cannot increase the competences of the EU, the referring court asked whether such conditions were met by this Decision. Specifically, with regard to the first condition, namely whether the Decision dealt with only Part Three of the TFEU, the referring court highlighted the potential impact of the establishment of a permanent stability mechanism on the common monetary policy, enshrined in the Part One of the TFEU and on which the EU has an exclusive competence. Since the TFEU does not provide any specific definition of monetary policy, the ECJ gave its interpretation in light of the different objectives pursued by the common monetary policy and the ESM. While the former is aimed at maintaining price stability, the latter is aimed at safeguarding the stability of the Euro area as a whole. Thus, according to the ECJ, "[e]ven though the stability of the euro area may have repercussions on the stability of the currency used within that area, an economic policy measure cannot be treated as equivalent to a monetary policy measure for the sole reason that it may have indirect effects on the stability of the euro" (Case C-370/12, Pringle, para 56). For this reason, according to the ECJ, the ESM does not concern Part One of the Treaty. With regard to the second condition, namely whether this Decision would have increased the competences of the EU, the ECJ affirmed that the amendment of Art. 136 TFEU did not create any legal basis for the EU to be able to take any action that was not also possible prior to the amendment. Specifically, according to the ECJ, "[e]ven though the ESM Treaty makes use of the Union's institutions, in particular the Commission and the ECB, that fact is not, in any event, capable of affecting the validity of Decision 2011/199, which in itself provides only for the establishment of a stability mechanism by the Member States and is silent on any possible role for the Union's institutions in that connection" Pringle, cit., para 74 XXX According to the report, "unemployment grew from 7.3 per cent in June 2008 to 27.9 per cent in June 2013, the highest in the European Union". Moreover, "[y]outh unemployment reached an unprecedented rate of 64.9 per cent in May 2013 (compared with an average of 24.4 in the euro zone)", ivi at 13. XXXI The report also registered that " [o] wing to the rise in long-term unemployment, only a fraction of all registered unemployed persons receive benefits (27 per cent as at February 2013). Moreover, unemployment benefits expire after 12 months, resulting in the loss of public health insurance cover. Many young people are not eligible for support because they have never had a job and have not paid the required national insurance contributions.
[…] These wholesale pension cuts have pushed a large proportion of the population into poverty.
[…] The Independent Expert shares the view of the European Committee of Social Rights that the 'cumulative effect' of the various laws introduced as 'austerity measures' in Greece since May 2010, restricting and reducing both public and private pension benefits, constituted a violation of the right to social security enshrined in article 12(3) of the European Social Charter". Ivi, at 15-16. XXXII According to the report, such illness has resurfaced owing to the discontinuation of anti-mosquito spraying programmes. Ivi, at 17. XXXIII Ibidem. XXXIV Ivi, at 19. XXXV Ivi, at 20. XXXVI The International Expert reported that " [i] n May 2013, the Government invoked national emergency legislation allowing it to compel public sector employees to work to ban a planned strike by the National Union for High School Teachers against austerity measures during university entrance examinations. […] There has also been a rise in hate crimes and xenophobia against the country's immigrant community, largely targeted in an attempt to find a scapegoat for the crisis. […] In April 2013, the National Commission for Human Rights (UNHCR) and a coalition of 30 non-governmental organizations documented 154 incidents of racist violence in 2012 alone, of which 151 committed against refugees and migrants and three against European citizens. It is believed that most attacks were committed by members of extremist groups, and that only a fraction of all cases are actually documented.
[…] Lastly, the enjoyment of human rights has been further undermined by the limited ability of public accountability bodies, such as the Greek Ombudsman and the National Commission for Human Rights, to respond adequately to human rights issues in the context of the economic crisis owing to insufficient funding for operations. Other barriers to access to justice include lengthy proceedings before civil and administrative courts, higher fees for initiating legal proceedings and inadequate funding for legal aid". Ivi, at 21-22. XXXVII XLV Specifically, uninsured deposits were converted into BoC shares (37.5% of each uninsured deposit), into instruments that were convertible by BoC either into shares or into deposits (22.5% of each uninsured deposit), and into instruments which were convertible into deposits by Central Bank of Cyprus (40% of each uninsured deposit). Additionally, certain assets and liabilities were transferred from Laïki to BoC, including deposits of up to Euro 100,000. Deposits over Euro 100,000 remained with Laïki, pending its liquidation. See GC, Case T-289/13, Lerda Advetising, para 17-18; Case T-290/13, CMBG, para 17-18; Case T-291/13, Eleftheriou, para 17-18; Case T-292/13, Evangelou, para 17-18; Case T-293/13, Theophilou, para 17-18; Case T-294/13, Fialtor, para 17-18. XLVI Only within the EFSF did the Eurogroup Working Group play a role in granting financial assistance. See Art. 2, EFSF Framework Agreement. XLVII Art. 5(1) and Art. 6(1) ESM Treaty. XLVIII Data available at http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited 15 Dec. 2015). XLIX It is precisely for that reason that De Sena highlighted the role played by inter-State communications "to bring to the fore violations raising issue of 'general importance', since such communications are not required to show -in order to be received by the Committee -that a 'clear disadvantage' has been suffered as a consequence of the alleged violation" (De Sena 2010: 261 LI The first applicant was a member of the Athens Bar, who worked as a member of the scientific staff of the Greek Ombudsman's Office and was later seconded to the central department of the Technical Chamber of Greece, a corporate body governed by public law. Thus, her pay was governed by laws on the salary rules applicable to public servants and public-sector employees. The second applicant was a trade union organisation representing several unions of public-sector workers employed on a permanent basis or under private law by the State, corporations governed by public law and the local and regional authorities. During 2010, the Greece Government adopted a law that reduced the pay of persons working in the public sectorirrespective of their employment status -by a percentage ranging from 12% to 30%, notwithstanding any other specific or general legislation, collective agreement, arbitration ruling or individual agreement or contract. Ivi, paras 3 and 4. LII Ivi, para 39. LIII The Court considers that "the extent of the reduction in the first applicant's salary was not such as to place her at risk of having insufficient means to live on and thus to constitute a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In view of the foregoing and of the particular context of crisis in which the interference in question occurred, the latter could not be said to have imposed an excessive burden on the applicant". Ivi, para 46. Moreover, as to the proportionality of the impugned measures with regard to the wages and pensions of the public servants affiliated to the second applicant, the Court referred to the text of the memorandum of understanding itself and affirmed that " [a] ccording to the memorandum, the abolition of the thirteenth and fourteenth pension payments was compensated for, in the case of persons receiving less than EUR 2,500 per month, by the introduction of a flat-rate bonus of EUR 800 per year. Furthermore, while the thirteenth and fourteenth salary payments were abolished across the board, an annual bonus of EUR 1,000 was introduced, funded by the reduction in the allowances previously payable to higher earners. This bonus was introduced with the aim of protecting those in the lowest income segments (persons receiving less than EUR 3,000 per month)". Ivi, para 47. LIV Art. 61 of DARIO. LV On the conditions for international responsibility to arise, see the Commentary to Art. 61 DARIO.
